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ARTICLES
FOREWORD: Mergers, Market Access
and the Millennium
Eleanor M. Fox*
The global economy is no longer merely a prospect. In all of its unti-
diness, it has arrived.
As Professor David Gerber astutely observes, in his review of Profes-
sor Spencer Weber Waller's Antitrust and American Business Abroad, in-
ternational antitrust is no longer simply a study of U.S. law and the limits of
its extraterritorial reach. It encompasses law, context, values, and evolu-
tionary paths of many nations. Good analysts must adjust their focus to the
new economic and regulatory world, which demands deeper, broader, and
more contextual understanding.
The effective analyst needs to know more about international economic
issues, how they tend to affect private and public institutions in many parts
of the world, and how decision makers view these developments. Often the
skills necessary to interpret these situations are as important as -- perhaps
more important than -- the skills necessary to operate within the U.S. anti-
trust system.
This symposium issue contains and conveys both information and
ideas for building the new knowledge. The articles focus in particular on
two emergent problems in the global economy -- market access and inter-
national mergers. The problem of market access emerges in the wake of
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lower trade barriers. As government restraints have receded, private re-
straints have emerged.
Moreover, as globalization proceeds, the number of international
mergers increases exponentially, as do merger control regimes. Any of
some 40 nations may vet and delay the same merger, although it may be
clearly harmless (95 percent of mergers are) and although some of the
regulating nations may be small economies with no differentiated market
and no real stake other than collection of a filing fee.
The articles in this symposium issue are descriptive, synthesizing, and
normative. The market access article of Professor Spencer Weber Waller
has all three qualities. It provides a history and evolution of the law at the
interface of trade and competition; a roadmap of the cooperative efforts of
nations and their increasing density; and a cautionary word about the limits
of antitrust in the quest for free markets; and it offers a prescription -- deep-
ened diplomatic antitrust solutions.
The article by Andre Fiebig addresses merger control. Mr. Fiebig is
internationalistic in his approach and more ambitious in his vision for su-
pranational coordination. Emphasizing the gross inefficiencies and super-
fluous overlapping multi-nation merger control systems, he makes a modest
proposal: a premerger control office in the framework of the World Trade
Organization for a limited purpose: "to assist business and regulators by
identifying those transactions which present no threat to competition." Ac-
tion of the office would be triggered only by the voluntary request of the
merging parties. A mechanism would be provided for regulating nations to
spring into action where their important interests would otherwise be im-
paired. By using methods of international coordination only to screen out
harmless mergers, Mr. Fiebig proposes to sidestep the sovereignty debate
and political opposition (especially by the United States) to international
antitrust coordination in the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
A third essay, by Professor S.G. Corones, provides a multli-faceted in-
depth treatment of the Australian merger law and its jurisdictional reach.
This essay is followed by an informative piece by William M. Hannay, pro-
viding helpful information for the corporate counselor on transnational as-
pects of mergers and acquisitions, substantive and procedural, in the United
States, the European Union, and the EU Member States of France, Italy,
Germany, and the UK. Concluding the collection, Professor Gerber's book
review cautions us to adapt our perspectives to the new inter-active, multi-
tiered world economy.
The symposium issue is a nice microcosm of the competition law is-
sues facing the world. It presents the tensions between national control and
world integration. It presents the twin, conflicting impulses to eschew in-
ternationalization, hoping to do well enough by deepened positive comity
(Waller), and to embrace internationalization at least cautiously to address
concerns where unharnessed operation of national interests obstructs effi-
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cient solutions and where internationalization is most likely to sidestep the
political landmines (Fiebig).
These twin tensions and impulses are revealed also in the recently is-
sued Report of the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
("ICPAC") to the U.S. Attorney General and Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust.1 The ICPAC Report and Professor Waller's analysis are quite
compatible; indeed Professor Waller contributed to the Committee's delib-
erations. The ICPAC Report on market access issues expresses particular
concern with private restraints facilitated by government action, suggests
further empirical and analytical studies on the scope of market-blocking re-
straints and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, encourages contin-
ued work of the WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition, proposes increase in the antitrust expertise at the WTO
and in country missions, and suggests inclusion of competition policy in the
WTO's country reviews.2 The members of ICPAC apart from this author
opposed market access competition rules in the WTO. In a separate state-
ment,3 however, I disagree. I note that market-closing private restraints are
the other side of the coin of market-closing public restraints, and suggest
that the WTO rules should be modestly extended to place on member na-
tions the responsibility to keep their markets free from artificial private as
well as public restraints. To avoid uncertainty of substantive law, I propose
choice of the excluding nation's law to determine what is "anticompetitive;"
and I suggest including, in a broadened market access provision, obligations
of non-discrimination, transparency and process.
The ICPAC Report also addresses merger issues. ICPAC found, like
Mr. Fiebig, that the overlapping merger control systems are excessively
burdensome and constitute bad regulation. ICPAC proposes a number of
incremental steps to alleviate the problems that arise from overlap and sys-
tems clash, including protocols against discrimination, against national
champion trumps, and against weighing non-competition interests, and it
suggests obligations of transparency proportionality. ICPAC also proposes
deeping merger review cooperation by means of cross-nation work sharing,
and, perhaps ultimately, integrated analysis of international mergers by
teams headed by a lead jurisdiction.4
As for pre-merger vetting and process, which is the issue Mr. Fiebig
addresses, ICPAC proposes only national solutions: the raising of merger
thresholds, the screening out (by each jurisdiction) of mergers unlikely to
generate an appreciable economic effect within that jurisdiction, de-linking
of filing fees from agency budgets (to remove an incentive for overreach-
' ICPAC Report (2000), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/icpac.htm>.
2 id. at ch 5.31d. at Annex 1-A.
41d. at ch 2.
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ing) where this can be done without undermining the work of the agency,
two-stage notification obligations to allow the agencies to identify possible
competitive issues and to close the investigation after receipt of a simple
form that reveals an absence of competition concerns, and a provision that
would allow notification of mergers at any time after the execution of a let-
ter of intent, contract, agreement in principle, or public bid, so as to allow
parties to proceed in all jurisdictions simultaneously 5
Again, as in the case of market access problems, the Committee was
reluctant to move from national level to a coordinated supranational level." I
alone would have gone further to propose an opt-in (thus voluntary)
premerger notification clearing house, wherein multinational merger parties
could file once, perhaps in the state at the center of gravity, and other inter-
ested states would be required to accord mutual recognition to the notifica-
tion.
7
In the globalizing world, the big questions will not go away; they will
become more urgent. National law has a poor and incomplete fit with in-
ternational markets. This volume contributes importantly both to the infra-
structure of knowledge and to the debate.
51d. at ch 3.6The Committee does, however, recognize the large number of international competition
issues that are not trade issues and proposes, as I do, the establishment of a world competi-
tion body to discuss these issues with all interested nations and non-governmental organiza-
tions ("NGOs") and perhaps to develop common approaches. See id. at ch. 6.7The other interested states would be free to require codicils for separate markets as
needed.
